Game-Theoretic Vaccination Against Networked SIS Epidemics and Impacts
  of Human Decision-Making by Hota, Ashish R. & Sundaram, Shreyas
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
08
75
0v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 M
ar 
20
19
Game-Theoretic Vaccination Against Networked SIS
Epidemics and Impacts of Human Decision-Making
Ashish R. Hota and Shreyas Sundaram
Abstract—We study decentralized protection strategies against
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We
consider a population game framework where nodes choose
whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk
is defined as the infection probability at the endemic state of
the epidemic under a degree-based mean-field approximation.
Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that
humans perceive probabilities and risks in a nonlinear fashion,
we specifically examine the impacts of such misperceptions on
the Nash equilibrium protection strategies. We first establish the
existence and uniqueness of a threshold equilibrium where nodes
with degrees larger than a certain threshold vaccinate. When
the vaccination cost is sufficiently high, we show that behavioral
biases cause fewer players to vaccinate, and vice versa. We
quantify this effect for a class of networks with power-law degree
distributions by proving tight bounds on the ratio of equilibrium
thresholds under behavioral and true perceptions of probabilities.
We further characterize the socially optimal vaccination policy
and investigate the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber, physical, and social systems are becoming increas-
ingly interdependent and interconnected. The security, robust-
ness, and resilience of these large-scale networked systems
depend on many factors, including the characteristics of at-
tacks [1, 2], topology of the network [3, 4], and centralized
vs. decentralized decision-making [1, 5]. In addition, decisions
made by humans that use these systems also have a significant
impact on their security and resilience [5, 6, 7].
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of game-theoretic
and human decision-making in the context of Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks [2]. SIS epi-
demics have been shown to capture a wide range of dynamics,
such as the spread of diseases in human society [8], viruses
in computer networks [9], and opinions in complex networks
[10]. There is indeed a large literature on network epidemics,
including mean-field approximations [11, 12], characteriza-
tions of steady-state behavior [13, 14], centralized protection
strategies to control the spreading processes [15, 4], and
network designs that are resilient against the epidemic [16, 17];
see [18, 2] for recent reviews. While centralized protection
strategies are not practical for large-scale networked systems,
decentralized and game-theoretic protection strategies against
network epidemics have been relatively less explored [18, 2].
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The existing literature has focused on two types of protection
strategies; i) nodes choose their curing rates independently
[19, 5], and ii) nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate
themselves [20, 21, 22].
In this paper, we focus on the second class of protection
strategies. The vaccination game has been studied in both
non-networked settings (i.e., with a fully mixed population)
[20, 21] and networked settings [22]. In [22], nodes decide
whether to purchase vaccination or risk being infected with
probability given by the endemic state of the N-Intertwined
Mean Field Approximation (NIMFA) [12] of the SIS dynam-
ics. The authors analyzed Nash equilibria in certain classes
of networks, specifically, complete graphs, complete bipartite
graphs, and multi-community networks. In a follow up work
[16], the authors studied game-theoretic design of networks
that are resistant against the SIS epidemic.
In addition to being limited to certain classes of networks, a
common assumption in the existing game-theoretic literature
on epidemics is that the decision-makers are risk neutral (i.e.,
expected cost minimizers), and perceive infection probabilities
as their true values. However, there is a large body of work
in psychology and behavioral economics that has shown that
humans perceive probabilities differently from their true values
[23, 24, 25] (see Section II for further details). Recent work
has shown that these behavioral aspects of decision-making,
specifically those captured by prospect theory [23], can have a
significant impact on the efficiency, security and robustness of
networked engineered systems [5, 26]. For instance, a recent
stream of papers investigate various implications of prospect-
theoretic preferences in the context of energy consumption
decisions in the smart grid [27, 28, 29], and pricing in
communication networks [30, 31].
Recent literature has also investigated the impacts of behav-
ioral biases, such as mis-perceptions of probabilities, on the
decisions made in the context of (network) security. In [32,
33], the authors consider a cloud computing environment with
a defender and a stealthy attacker, and investigate the pure and
mixed Nash equilibria when both entities have (cumulative)
prospect-theoretic preferences. They identify conditions under
which behavioral biases of the attacker improve the security of
the system. Impacts of nonlinear probability weighting were
also studied for interdependent network security games [3] and
network interdiction games [7].
Epidemic models are fundamentally different compared to
the above settings. In contrast with [32, 33], epidemics have
multiple decision-makers captured by nodes in the network,
and in contrast with [3], epidemics spread through the network
via a stochastic process. In the context of epidemics, there
is a related body of research that investigates certain human
aspects of decision-making, particularly imitation behavior
[34, 35], and empathy [36] in an evolutionary game-theoretic
framework. On the other hand, the impacts of human (mis)-
perception of probabilities are relatively less explored; an
exception is our recent work [37] which studies game-theoretic
choices of curing rates by the nodes in the network.
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic vaccination
decisions against SIS epidemics in general networks under
both true as well as human perception of infection proba-
bilities (captured by prospect-theoretic probability weighting
functions). Since we consider a cost minimization framework,
we refer to players who perceive probabilities as their true
values as true expectation minimizers. We consider the degree-
based mean-field (DBMF) approximation [11, 2] to capture
the infection probabilities experienced by the nodes. While
the DBMF approximation is coarser than the NIMFA, it is
more tractable to analyze.
We consider a population game framework to model strate-
gic decision-making by nodes in large-scale networks; this is
motivated by recent works by La on a related class of network
security games [38, 39].1 We consider all nodes with a given
degree as a single population. The nodes choose whether or
not to purchase vaccination at a cost c > 0. A vaccinated
player is completely immune from the infection. The social
state is defined as the fractions of nodes of each population that
vaccinate and remain unprotected. Each node is viewed as an
infinitesimal entity, and the change in action of a single node
does not change the social state. The social state determines
the spreading behavior of the epidemic, which we approximate
under the DBMF framework. For a given social state, we
identify conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an
endemic state of the DBMF approximation where the epidemic
persists. The cost of a node who remains unprotected is defined
as the perceived infection probability at the endemic state
induced by the social state (and therefore, depends on the
actions taken by all nodes in the network).
A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of a population game is a
social state where no player prefers to unilaterally switch to a
different action. We first show that at a PNE social state, all
nodes with degrees strictly larger than a threshold vaccinate,
and vice versa. In addition, we show that there exists a unique
PNE social state. We then prove that when the vaccination
is costly, behavioral biases cause fewer nodes to vaccinate,
and hence they experience a higher infection probability.
In addition, under power-law degree distributions (that are
characteristics of real-world networks that arise in different
domains [40]), we obtain bounds on the equilibrium thresholds
for both true and nonlinear perceptions of probabilities, and
show that the ratio of these equilibrium thresholds grows
unbounded as the vaccination cost increases. We then obtain
bounds on the inefficiency of PNE, and numerically illustrate
our main theoretical findings.
1While La also considers cascades of infection, and some of our structural
results such as threshold property and uniqueness of PNE are analogous to
those in [38, 39], our setting with epidemics is quite different from his. In
addition, we investigate the impacts of human decision-making while [38, 39]
only consider risk neutral decision-makers.
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Fig. 1: Shape of the probability weighting function (1); x is
the true probability, and w(x) is the perceived probability.
II. NONLINEAR PROBABILITY WEIGHTING
A substantial body of literature in behavioral economics
and psychology has shown that humans perceive probabilities
associated with uncertain outcomes in a nonlinear fashion
[23, 24]. Specifically, humans overweight probabilities that are
close to 0 (referred to as possibility effect), and underweight
probabilities that are close to 1 (referred to as certainty effect).
In the prospect theory framework [23], Kahneman and Tversky
captured the transformation of true probabilities into perceived
probabilities by an inverse S-shaped probability weighting
function w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (i.e., a true probability x is
perceived as w(x)). Several parametric forms of weighting
functions have been proposed [41, 42]. These weighting func-
tions have the same general shape shown in Figure 1, and
satisfy the following properties [3].
Assumption 1: w satisfies the following properties.
1. w is strictly increasing, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
2. w′(x) has a unique minimum denoted by xmin,w :=
argminx∈[0,1]w
′(x). Furthermore, w′(xmin,w) < 1 and
w′′(xmin,w) = 0.
3. w(x) is strictly concave for x ∈ [0, xmin,w), and is
strictly convex for x ∈ (xmin,w, 1].
4. w′(ǫ)→∞ as ǫ→ 0, and w′(1− ǫ)→∞ as ǫ→ 0.
The above assumptions imply that there exists a unique x0,w ∈
[0, 1] such that w(x) > x for x ∈ [0, x0,w), and w(x) < x for
x ∈ (x0,w, 1].
While our theoretical results hold for any weighting function
satisfying Assumption 1, we consider the parametric form
proposed by Prelec [42] in our simulations to give insights
on the impacts of smaller and larger deviations from true
perception of probability. When the true probability of an
outcome is x, the Prelec weighting function with parameter
α ∈ (0, 1] is given by
w(x) = exp(−(− ln(x))α), x ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where exp(·) is the exponential function. For α = 1, we
have w(x) = x. It can be verified that for α ∈ (0, 1),
the Prelec weighting function (1) satisfies Assumption 1. For
α < 1, w has a sharper overweighting of low probabilities
and underweighting of high probabilities. Figure 1 shows the
shape of the Prelec weighting function for different values of
α. For the Prelec weighting function, xmin,w = x0,w =
1
e
, and
w(1
e
) = 1
e
for every α ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, w′(1
e
) = α.
III. VACCINATION GAME
We first introduce the population game framework where
the nodes decide whether or not to vaccinate themselves. We
then discuss how the behavior of the SIS epidemic depends
on the decisions taken by the nodes, and define the infection
probabilities at the endemic state of the DBMF approximation.
A. Network population game
Consider an undirected network G where D :=
{1, 2, . . . , D}, D < ∞, is the set of degrees of the nodes.
We treat all nodes with a given degree as a single population,
and refer all nodes with degree d ∈ D as population d. The
fraction of nodes with degree d is denoted bymd. Accordingly,
the vector {md}d∈D is the empirical degree distribution of the
network. We denote the average degree by 〈d〉 :=
∑
d∈D dmd
and define 〈d2〉 :=
∑
d∈D d
2md with both 〈d〉, 〈d2〉 ∈ (0,∞).
We further assume that the network is uncorrelated, i.e., the
probability that an edge originating from a node with degree
k is connected to a node with degree k′ is independent of
k. For uncorrelated networks, the probability that a randomly
chosen neighbor has degree d is approximately qd :=
dmd
〈d〉 [2].
The approximation improves as the number of nodes grows to
infinity, which is the regime in a population game.
The nodes in the network have two available pure strategies
or actions denoted by A = {V, U}. The state of population
d ∈ D is denoted by xd = (xd,U, xd,V), where xd,U (re-
spectively, xd,V) represents the subpopulation of nodes that
choose to remain unprotected (respectively, vaccinated). Since
each node must choose either to remain unprotected or to
vaccinate, we have xd,U + xd,V = md. Accordingly, the set
of feasible population states for population d is Xd = {xd ∈
R
2
+|xd,U + xd,V = md}. The social state is denoted by the
vector x = {xd}d∈D ∈ X :=
∏
d∈DXd.
Each node experiences a cost as a function of her degree
(i.e., the population she belongs to), her chosen action, and
the social state. When the social state is x ∈ X , the (expected
perceived) cost of a degree d node who chooses an action a ∈
A is denoted by Jd(a,x). Following [38], we define the pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the population game as follows.
Definition 1: A social state x∗ ∈ X is a PNE of the
population game if for every a ∈ A, d ∈ D, we have
x∗d,a > 0 =⇒ a ∈ argmin
a′∈A
Jd(a
′,x∗)
⇐⇒ Jd(a,x
∗) ≤ Jd(a
′,x∗), ∀a′ ∈ A. (2)
According to Definition 1, if a nonzero fraction of nodes of
a given population choose a certain action a ∈ A at a PNE,
then the action a must achieve the minimum cost for nodes
of that population at the PNE.2 This definition is analogous
to that of a PNE in strategic games (with a finite number
of players) in the sense that no node prefers to unilaterally
deviate to a different action, but the distinction being that such
an unilateral deviation does not change the social state in the
population game (as opposed to strategic games). Thus, in
2In particular, if at a PNE social state x∗, there is a population d such that
both x∗
d,U
> 0 and x∗
d,V
> 0, then Jd(U,x
∗) = Jd(V, x
∗).
population games, individual nodes do not have an impact on
the population and social states.
The above formulation is motivated by an analogous pop-
ulation game model studied in [38, 39] for a related class
of network security games, while in this paper, we focus on
the SIS epidemic model. We now describe the dynamics and
steady-state of the SIS epidemic for a given social state.
B. SIS epidemic and DBMF approximation
The spreading process of the SIS epidemic depends on
the decisions taken by the players, i.e., the social state of
the population game. Specifically, nodes who vaccinate are
completely immune from the epidemic, and do not play
a role in the spread of the epidemic. On the other hand,
each unprotected node in the network can be in one of two
states: i) susceptible, or ii) infected. The vaccinated nodes are
neither susceptible nor infected. Among unprotected nodes,
an infected node is cured with a homogeneous curing rate
δ > 0, while a susceptible node becomes infected following a
Poisson process with rate ν = 1 (without loss of generality)
per infected neighbor. Thus, an unprotected node experiences
no risk of infection from its vaccinated neighbors.
Consider a social state x, which captures the fraction of un-
protected and vaccinated nodes in each population. Under the
DBMF approximation [11, 2], every unprotected node with a
given degree d is treated as statistically equivalent. According
to the DBMF approximation, the infection probability of an
unprotected degree d node, pˆd(x, t), evolves as
∂pˆd(x, t)
∂t
= −δpˆd(x, t) + (1 − pˆd(x, t))d
∑
i∈D
qi
xi,U
mi
pˆi(x, t),
(3)
where qi =
imi
〈d〉 is the probability that a randomly chosen
neighbor has degree i (as a consequence of the assumption that
the network is uncorrelated), and
xi,U
mi
captures the fraction of
degree i nodes that are unprotected in the social state x. The
DBMF approximation is better if the timescale at which nodes
interact or mix with each other in the random graph model is
faster than the timescale at which the epidemic spreads [11, 2].
Accordingly, we express the steady-state infection probabil-
ity of an unprotected degree d node as
pd(x) =
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
, (4)
where v(x) denotes the probability that a randomly chosen
neighbor is infected in the steady-state of the epidemic induced
by the social state x. In particular, v(x) satisfies
v(x) =
∑
i∈D
qi ·
xi,U
mi
·
iv(x)
δ + iv(x)
,
=⇒ v(x)
[
1−
∑
i∈D
iqˆi(x)
δ + iv(x)
]
= 0, (5)
where qˆi(x) :=
ixi,U
〈d〉 .
Remark 1: The above equation holds under the assumption
that the network is uncorrelated. Otherwise, the probability
that a randomly chosen neighbor of a degree d node has degree
i would depend on both d and i, and not just on i as in (3).
Thus, v(x) would also be different for different values of d.
Note that v(x) = 0 is always a solution of the above
equation for every social state, which corresponds to the
disease-free state pd(x) = 0, ∀d ∈ D. Furthermore, depending
on the social state x, there may exist a nonzero v(x) ∈ (0, 1]
that satisfies (5). The set of infection probabilities pd(x)
induced by this nonzero v(x) according to (4) is referred
to as the “endemic” state where the epidemic persists in the
population for a long time [12, 2].
We state the following result on the uniqueness and stability
of the endemic state. To the best of our knowledge, the
following result is the first time where those properties are
shown for the DBMF approximation. While we rely on the
results obtained for the NIMFA in [13, 43], we exploit certain
structural similarities between the two models in the proof.
The proof is formally presented in Appendix A.
Theorem 1: For a given social state x, define R(x) :=∑
d∈D
dqˆd(x)
δ
=
∑
d∈D
d2xd,U
δ〈d〉 . Then,
1) pd(x) = 0, ∀d ∈ D is the unique steady-state of the
dynamics in (3) if and only if R(x) ≤ 1. This disease
free steady-state is globally asymptotically stable.
2) If R(x) > 1, pd(x) = 0, ∀d ∈ D is an unstable
equilibrium of the dynamics (3). There exists a nonzero
positive steady-state of (3) (referred to as the endemic
state) with pd(x) > 0, ∀d ∈ D if and only if R(x) > 1.
The endemic state is unique, locally exponentially stable,
and the dynamics (3) converge to this endemic state from
any initial condition except the disease free state.
It follows from the above theorem that if R(x) > 1 for
a social state x, then there exists a unique nonzero v(x)
satisfying (5). In that case, we interpret v(x) to be this nonzero
solution. The infection probabilities of the unprotected nodes
in the endemic state are then nonzero and given by (4).
IV. PROPERTIES OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
With the above framework in place, we now define the cost
functions of the players and establish the existence of a unique
threshold equilibrium for both true and perceived expectation
minimizers in general networks.
Each node independently decides whether or not to vac-
cinate. For a node who remains unprotected, we define her
cost as her perceived infection probability at the endemic state
under the DBMF approximation of the epidemic. Specifically,
the cost of an unprotected degree d node in social state x is
Jd(U,x) = w(pd(x)) = w
(
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
)
, (6)
where w is the probability weighting function of the nodes,
and v(x) satisfies (5). Specifically, if R(x) ≤ 1, v(x) = 0.
Otherwise, v(x) is the nonzero solution of (5). The above
cost function can be interpreted as the expected cost under
cumulative prospect theory [41], where the perceived loss of
being infected is normalized to 1.
On the other hand, we assume that vaccination is available
at a cost c ∈ (0, 1) irrespective of the degrees of the nodes.
Therefore, Jd(V,x) = c for every d ∈ D,x ∈ X . Here c can
be interpreted as the relative cost of vaccination compared
to the cost of being infected. Note that if c ≥ 1, we will
always have Jd(U,x) < c, i.e., all nodes will prefer to remain
unprotected.
We consider a complete information game denoted by
Γ(G, {md}d∈D, w, c, δ). Since Γ(G, {md}d∈D, w, c, δ) has a
finite number of populations and actions, there always exists
a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) [44].
Remark 2: As in any complete information game, the nodes
are assumed to be aware of the social state and the degree
distribution, from which they can compute the quantity v(x).
We envision two possible ways in which nodes can estimate
v(x) in practice. First, a central authority broadcasts this
information among the population; for instance, via news
and social media. Second, nodes can learn or estimate v(x)
by repeatedly interacting with their neighbors, and observing
the frequency with which they get infected. It would be an
interesting direction for future research to explicitly model the
dynamics of the epidemic game where nodes estimate v(x)
and update their vaccination decisions, and explore whether
the dynamics converge to the equilibria studied in this work.
We now discuss the characteristics of vaccination strategies
that arise at a Nash equilibrium. We start with the following
result which shows that if the curing rate is not sufficiently
high, then at every PNE social state, there exists an endemic
state such that the epidemic persists.
Proposition 1: Let x∗ be the social state at a PNE. Then,
R(x∗) > 1 if and only if δ < 〈d
2〉
〈d〉 =
∑
d∈D d
2md∑
d∈D dmd
.
Proof: Let δ <
〈d2〉
〈d〉 . Assume on the contrary that
R(x∗) ≤ 1 for a PNE social state x∗. Then, from Theorem
1, we have v(x∗) = 0. Now, let d ∈ D be a population of
nodes such that a non-negligible fraction of degree d nodes
vaccinate, i.e., x∗d,V > 0. However, following Definition 1, this
implies c ≤ w(pd(x∗)) = 0. Since c > 0, we must necessarily
have x∗d,V = 0, or equivalently, x
∗
d,U = md for every d ∈ D.
As a consequence, we have
R(x∗) =
∑
d∈D
d2md
δ〈d〉
=
〈d2〉
δ〈d〉
> 1,
which is the desired contradiction.
For the converse, we need to show that R(x∗) > 1 =⇒
δ <
〈d2〉
〈d〉 . We prove the statement by contraposition. Suppose
δ ≥ 〈d
2〉
〈d〉 . Now, consider a PNE social state x
∗. Then,
R(x∗) =
∑
d∈D
d2x∗d,U
δ〈d〉
≤
〈d2〉
δ〈d〉
≤ 1.
This completes the proof.
The above result holds for both true as well as perceived
expected cost minimizers. The proof shows that if δ ≥ 〈d
2〉
〈d〉 ,
then even for a social state where no node purchases vaccina-
tion, the disease free state is the only solution of the DBMF
approximation. In other words, the epidemic disappears solely
because of high curing rate, and independently of the vacci-
nation decisions by the players. Therefore, we focus on the
more interesting case where the spread of the disease depends
on the vaccination decisions of the nodes.
Note that a similar result was obtained in [19] where
nodes chose their curing rates strategically. At the resulting
equilibrium, the quantity analogous to R(x∗) was greater than
or equal to 1, but never strictly less than 1. We now impose
the following assumption in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 2: The curing rate δ ∈
(
0, 〈d
2〉
〈d〉
)
. Furthermore,
either w(x) = x, or w satisfies Assumption 1.
We now derive certain properties of the social states at the
PNE. Let x∗ be the social state at a PNE. Consider a degree d
such that x∗d,U > 0, i.e., a nonzero fraction of degree d nodes
have not purchased vaccination. Then, we must have
w(pd(x
∗)) = w
(
dv(x∗)
δ + dv(x∗)
)
≤ c. (7)
Similarly, if for the population of degree d nodes x∗d,V = md−
x∗d,U > 0, we must have
w(pd(x
∗)) = w
(
dv(x∗)
δ + dv(x∗)
)
≥ c. (8)
The following result shows that any PNE of the vaccination
game exhibits a threshold property.
Proposition 2: Let x∗ be the social state at a PNE. Then,
there exists a degree d such that x∗d,U ∈ (0,md], and
x∗d,U =
{
md, d < d
0, d > d.
(9)
Proof: Let d¯ ∈ D be the smallest degree such that a
nonzero fraction of nodes with degree d¯ vaccinate, i.e., md¯ −
x∗
d¯,U
> 0. Since w is an increasing function, we have
c ≤ w
(
d¯v(x∗)
δ + d¯v(x∗)
)
< w
(
dv(x∗)
δ + dv(x∗)
)
,
for every d > d¯. Note that v(x∗) > 0 following Assumption
2. Accordingly, x∗d,U = 0 for every d > d¯. In other words,
all nodes with degree strictly larger than d¯ vaccinate. We now
have the following two possible cases.
Case 1: x∗
d¯,U
= 0. In this case, all nodes with degree d¯
vaccinate. Since d¯ is the smallest degree with a nonzero
fraction of vaccinated nodes, all nodes with degree d < d¯
remain unprotected. Therefore, d := d¯ − 1 has the threshold
property stated in (9) (with x∗d,U = md).
Case 2: x∗
d¯,U
> 0. In this case, we have
c = w
(
d¯v(x∗)
δ + d¯v(x∗)
)
> w
(
dv(x∗)
δ + dv(x∗)
)
,
for all d < d¯. Therefore, x∗d,U = md for every d < d. Thus,
d := d¯ has the threshold property stated in (9).
Note that high degree nodes are more likely to encounter
infected nodes among their neighbors than nodes with a
smaller degree. This is because the network is assumed to
be uncorrelated. The above result then confirms our intuition
that high degree nodes are more likely to vaccinate at the
equilibrium as they experience a higher infection risk.
A similar threshold behavior was also obtained in [22] under
the NIMFA for specific classes of networks (specifically, com-
plete graphs, complete bipartite graphs and multi-community
networks). Our result shows that this property holds under
the DBMF approximation in general networks. Furthermore,
in [45], it was shown that in networks with power-law degree
distributions, vaccinating high degree nodes is highly effective
in reducing the spread of the epidemic. In this paper, we
show that such strategies arise naturally under decentralized
decision-making, and in networks that are uncorrelated (as
opposed to only under power-law degree distributions).
Following Proposition 2, we observe that the population
states of unprotected nodes at any PNE are of the form
x∗
U
= {m1,m2, . . . ,md−1, x
∗
d,U, 0, . . . , 0}, (10)
with x∗d,U ∈ (0,md] for some d. Therefore, we refer to social
states where the population states of unprotected nodes have
the above form as candidate social states. We define the
following preference relation between candidate social states.
Definition 2: For two candidate social states x1 and x2 with
populations of unprotected nodes given by
x1,U = {m1,m2, . . . ,md
1
−1, x1,d
1
,U, 0, . . . , 0}, and (11)
x2,U = {m1,m2, . . . ,md
2
−1, x2,d
2
,U, 0, . . . , 0}, (12)
we say x1 ≺ x2 if (i) either d1 < d2 or (ii) d1 = d2 and
x1,d
1
,U < x2,d
2
,U. Similarly, we say x1  x2 if either x1 ≺ x2
or d1 = d2 and x1,d1,U = x2,d2,U.
In other words, x1  x2 if the fraction of unprotected nodes
in x1 is at most that of x2. We now state the following lemma
which will be useful in proving several of our results.
Lemma 1: Consider two candidate social states x1 and x2.
If x1  x2, then v(x1) ≤ v(x2) with the inequality being
strict if x1 ≺ x2.
Proof: Suppose v(x1) > 0; otherwise the result trivially
holds. If x1  x2, from (5) we have∑
d∈D
d2x1,d,U
δ + dv(x1)
= 〈d〉 =
∑
d∈D
d2x2,d,U
δ + dv(x2)
≥
∑
d∈D
d2x1,d,U
δ + dv(x2)
.
The above equation implies v(x1) ≤ v(x2). Furthermore, the
inequality in the above equation is strict if x1 ≺ x2.
The above lemma shows that among two candidate social
states, if one of the social states has a larger fraction of
unprotected nodes, then for that social state, the probability
of a randomly chosen neighbor being infected is higher. The
above lemma and the following uniqueness result hold for both
true and nonlinear perception of probabilities.
Proposition 3: Let x1 and x2 be two PNE social states.
Then, v(x1) = v(x2). Furthermore, x1 = x2.
Proof: Following Proposition 2, let d1 and d2 denote the
thresholds for social states x1 and x2, respectively. In other
words, d1 and d2 are the largest degrees such that x1,d1,U > 0
and x2,d
2
,U > 0, respectively. Furthermore, the population of
unprotected nodes in x1 and x2 can be represented as (11)
and (12), respectively. Note that x2,d
2
,U ≤ md
2
. Accordingly,
from (5), v(x2) satisfies
1 =
∑
d∈D
dqˆd(x2)
δ + dv(x2)
≤
1
〈d〉
d
2∑
d=1
d2md
δ + dv(x2)
. (13)
Now assume on the contrary that v(x1) < v(x2) without
loss of generality. From the definition of PNE, we have
w
(
d2v(x1)
δ + d2v(x1)
)
< w
(
d2v(x2)
δ + d2v(x2)
)
≤ c (14)
=⇒ x1,d
2
,U = md
2
.
In other words, all d2 nodes remain unprotected at x1. Ac-
cordingly, we have d2 ≤ d1. Thus, v(x1) satisfies
1 =
∑
d∈D
dqˆd(x1)
δ + dv(x1)
≥
1
〈d〉
d
2∑
d=1
d2md
δ + dv(x1)
; (15)
the above inequality is strict if d2 < d1, and also holds when
d2 = d1 since x1,d2,U = md2 .
Therefore, from equations (13) and (15), we have
d
2∑
d=1
d2md
δ + dv(x1)
≤
d
2∑
d=1
d2md
δ + dv(x2)
=⇒ v(x1) ≥ v(x2),
which gives the desired contradiction.
Consequently, we have v(x1) = v(x2). Now, suppose
x1 ≺ x2. Then, Lemma 1 implies v(x1) < v(x2), which
is a contradiction. Thus, we must have x1 = x2.
V. COMPARISON OF EQUILIBRIA UNDER TRUE AND
PERCEIVED EXPECTATION MINIMIZERS
Having established the existence and uniqueness of PNE in
the vaccination game under both true and perceived expecta-
tion minimizers, we now compare their characteristics.
Let xw be the PNE social state, and xw
U
be the population of
unprotected nodes at the PNE of a game where the probability
weighting function of the nodes is w. Following Proposition
2, xw
U
= {m1,m2, . . . , xwdw , 0, . . . , 0}, where x
w
dw
∈ (0,mdw ].
Let v(xw) be the probability that a randomly chosen neighbor
is infected at the PNE. From the definition of PNE, we have
w
(
dwv(x
w)
δ + dwv(xw)
)
≤ c ≤ w
(
(dw + 1)v(x
w)
δ + (dw + 1)v(xw)
)
, (16)
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Since w is
strictly increasing, from the first inequality above, we have
dwv(x
w)
δ + dwv(xw)
≤ w−1(c)
=⇒ 1− w−1(c) ≤ 1−
dwv(x
w)
δ + dwv(xw)
=
δ
δ + dwv(xw)
=⇒ dwv(x
w) ≤
δw−1(c)
1− w−1(c)
.
Following identical steps for the second inequality, we con-
clude that (16) is equivalent to
dwv(x
w) ≤
δw−1(c)
1− w−1(c)
≤ (dw + 1)v(x
w). (17)
We now state the following main result.
Proposition 4: Let xt be the PNE social state under true
expectation minimizers. If the vaccination cost c satisfies c ≥
w(c), then we have xt  xw, and vice versa.
Proof: Let xt
U
= {m1,m2, . . . , xtdt , 0, . . . , 0}. Suppose
c ≥ w(c), and assume on the contrary that xw ≺ xt. Following
Lemma 1, we have v(xt) > v(xw). Therefore, we have
dtv(x
w) < dtv(x
t) ≤
δc
1− c
≤
δw−1(c)
1− w−1(c)
,
where the second inequality follows from (17), and the last
inequality follows since c ≥ w(c), or equivalently, w−1(c) ≥
c. Consequently, dtv(x
w) < δw
−1(c)
1−w−1(c) implies
dtv(x
w)(1− w−1(c)) < δw−1(c)
=⇒ w
(
dtv(x
w)
δ + dtv(xw)
)
< c =⇒ xwdt = mdt ,
i.e., all nodes of degree dt are unprotected at the PNE under
probability weighting. Therefore, we have xt  xw, which is
the desired contradiction. The case where c ≤ w(c) follows
from identical arguments, and in that case, we have xw  xt.
We omit the details in the interest of space.
The key intuition behind the above result is that the vacci-
nation cost is very close to the perceived infection probability
at the PNE threshold, which is a consequence of (16). Con-
sequently, at a high vaccination cost, the perceived infection
probability at the equilibrium threshold is also high. For a
given perceived probability, the true probability is higher under
nonlinear probability weighting compared to true expectation
minimizers, due to underweighting of high probabilities. Thus,
for large vaccination costs, behavioral biases cause fewer
nodes to vaccinate compared to the case with true expec-
tation minimizers. Specifically, the equilibrium threshold is
higher under nonlinear probability weighting. The converse
is true when the vaccination cost is sufficiently small where
the decision-makers overweight low infection probabilities.
Consequently, for low vaccination costs, a higher population
of nodes vaccinate at the PNE under probability weighting.
We emphasize that the above result holds irrespective of the
degree distribution of the network, and only depends on the
vaccination cost c and the probability weighting function w.
The generality of this result has significant policy implications:
it is beneficial to reduce vaccination costs below the level
where w(c) = c such that behavioral biases, specifically
overweighting of low probabilities, lead to a higher rate of
vaccination. In contrast, if behavioral biases are not taken into
account and vaccines are relatively costly, vaccination rates
among the human population could be far lower than what
is anticipated for risk neutral decision makers. The following
subsection quantifies this effect in a class of networks with a
power-law degree distribution.
A. Networks with a power-law degree distribution
We now consider a class of networks where the set of
degrees is D = {d0, d1, . . . , D} with d0 ≥ 1, D < ∞. We
assume that the fraction of nodes with degree d ∈ D obeys
the power-law with exponent β ∈ [2, 3], i.e., md = κd−β ,
where κ = (
∑
d∈D d
−β)−1 is the normalization constant. Our
primary motivation for considering this model is that networks
with a power-law degree distribution with exponent 3 (and
more generally in the interval [2, 3]) arise in a wide range of
settings, and in particular, under the the Baraba´si-Albert (BA)
preferential attachment model [40].
Before comparing the equilibrium thresholds, we first obtain
bounds on the steady-state infection probability for threshold-
based social states. Let xt be the social state and xt,U be the
population of unprotected nodes where all nodes with degree
at most t are unprotected, and all nodes with degree strictly
larger than t are vaccinated, i.e.,
xt,U := {md0,md1 , . . . ,mt, 0, . . . , 0}. (18)
The probability that a randomly chosen neighbor is infected at
the endemic state under this social state is denoted by vβ(xt)
for a power-law distribution with exponent β; vβ(xt) satisfies
1=
t∑
i=d0
i2mi
〈d〉(δ + ivβ(xt))
=
κ
〈d〉
t∑
i=d0
1
iβ−2(δ + ivβ(xt))
. (19)
We first obtain the following bounds.
Lemma 2: Consider a network with a power-law degree
distribution with exponent β ∈ [2, 3]. Let the threshold t be
large enough such that vβ(xt) > 0. Then,
t− d0B1
t− d0
≤
tvβ(xt)
δ + tvβ(xt)
, (20)
where B1 = exp(
δ〈d〉
κ
). If, in addition, β = 3 and d0 > 1,
then
tv3(xt)
δ + tv3(xt)
≤
t− (d0 − 1)B1
t− d0 + 1
. (21)
The result is obtained by bounding the summation in (19)
with appropriate integrals. The proof is presented in Appendix
B. We now apply the above bounds to show how equilibrium
thresholds behave as functions of the vaccination cost c.
Proposition 5: Consider a vaccination game on a network
with a power-law degree distribution with exponent β ∈ [2, 3].
Let dw(c) denote the equilibrium threshold when the vaccina-
tion cost is c, and the weighting function is w. Then,
dw(c) ≤ min
(
D, 1 + d0 +
d0(B1 − 1)
1− w−1(c)
)
.
Proof: Let xw(c) denote the PNE social state. Suppose
dw(c) ≥ d0 + 1; otherwise the result trivially holds. Recall
from (18) that a social state where all nodes up to degree
dw(c)− 1 are unprotected is denoted by xdw(c)−1. Following
Lemma 1, we have v(xw(c)) > v(xdw(c)−1). From the
definition of PNE and (20) in Lemma 2, we obtain
c ≥ w
(
(dw(c)− 1)v(xdw(c)−1)
δ + (dw(c)− 1)v(xdw(c)−1)
)
=⇒ w−1(c) ≥
dw(c)− 1− d0B1
dw(c)− 1− d0
=⇒ 1− w−1(c) ≤ 1−
dw(c)− 1− d0B1
dw(c)− 1− d0
=
d0(B1 − 1)
dw(c)− 1− d0
=⇒ dw(c)− 1− d0 ≤
d0(B1 − 1)
1− w−1(c)
.
The result holds as the maximum degree is D.
Note that the upper bound obtained above does not depend
on the power-law exponent β as long as β ∈ [2, 3]. Fur-
thermore, the bound on the equilibrium vaccination threshold
increases as the vaccination cost c increases to 1, and is
inversely proportional to 1− w−1(c). In particular, as c→ 1,
underweighting of high probabilities implies that w−1(c) > c.
Accordingly, 1 − c > 1 − w−1(c), and the bound on the
threshold is higher under probability weighting, which is
consistent with our observation from Proposition 4.
In the special case where the exponent β = 3, the following
result obtains tight bounds on the ratio of equilibrium thresh-
olds under nonlinear and true perceptions of probabilities.
Proposition 6: Consider a network with a power-law degree
distribution with exponent β = 3 and d0 > 1. For vaccination
cost c, denote equilibrium thresholds under true and perceived
expectation minimizers to be dt(c) and dw(c). Then,
dw(c)
dt(c)
= Θ
(
1− c
1− w−1(c)
)
.
Proof: First, we consider the PNE under true expectation
minimizers. Following Proposition 5, we have
dt(c)− 1− d0 ≤
d0(B1 − 1)
1− c
.
We now obtain a lower bound on dt(c) following the second
part of Lemma 2. Let xt(c) be the social state at the PNE
with true expectation minimizers. Since all nodes with degree
at most dt(c) are unprotected at the social state xdt(c), we
have xt(c)  xdt(c), and following Lemma 1, v(x
t(c)) ≤
v(xdt(c)). From the definition of the PNE and together with
(21) in Lemma 2, we obtain
c ≤
dt(c)v(xdt(c))
δ + dt(c)v(xdt(c))
≤
dt(c)− (d0 − 1)B1
dt(c)− d0 + 1
=⇒ 1− c ≥ 1−
dt(c)− (d0 − 1)B1
dt(c)− d0 + 1
=
(d0 − 1)(B1 − 1)
dt(c) + 1− d0
=⇒ dt(c) + 1− d0 ≥
(d0 − 1)(B1 − 1)
1− c
.
From the above computations, we have dt(c) = Θ((1−c)−1).
Following the definition of PNE under nonlinear probability
weighting (16), and repeating the above arguments, we have
dw(c) = Θ((1− w−1(c))−1). This concludes the proof.
Thus, the upper bound in (21) in Lemma 2 enables us to
derive a more refined result for the special case when the ex-
ponent β = 3. Recall from Assumption 1 that w′(1− ǫ)→∞
as ǫ → 0. Therefore, as c → 1,
(
1−c
1−w−1(c)
)
→ ∞. Thus, in
networks with a power-law degree distribution with exponent
3, the threshold under probability weighting is significantly
higher compared to the threshold under true expectation min-
imizers when c → 1. In other words, when the vaccination
cost approaches the cost of being infected, underweighting
of probabilities causes even nodes with very high degrees to
not vaccinate against the epidemic. As a result, the network
could be highly susceptible to the spread of the epidemic. Our
results highlight the importance of incorporating the behavioral
biases of the decision-makers; otherwise we could significantly
underestimate the epidemic risks in human populations.
VI. SOCIAL OPTIMUM AND INEFFICIENCY OF PNE
In order to characterize the inefficiency of the PNE, we
consider the case where a central authority decides which
nodes to vaccinate (i.e., the social state) in order to minimize
a social cost. We start by showing that the socially optimal
vaccination policy also has a threshold property similar to that
at a PNE. We define the social cost at a social state x as
Ψ(x) :=
∑
d∈D
∑
a∈A
xd,aJd(a,x)
=
∑
d∈D
[
xd,U
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
+ (md − xd,U)c
]
= c+
∑
d∈D
xd,U
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
− c
]
, (22)
since
∑
d∈Dmd = 1. Note from the second equality above
that the social cost is composed of two terms; the first
is the expected fraction of nodes that are infected in the
endemic state and the second is normalized cost of vaccination.
Furthermore, the social cost is the total true expected cost
of all populations, i.e., the central authority does not have
behavioral biases. The following result shows that the socially
optimal vaccination policy follows a threshold behavior.
Proposition 7: Let y∗ ∈ argmin
x∈X Ψ(x). Suppose there
exists a degree d′ such that y∗d′,U < md. Then, y
∗
d,U = 0 for
every d > d′.
Proof: Note that Ψ(x) is continuous in x; when v(x) is
nonzero, it is continuous in x following (5). Thus, y∗ exists.
Assume on the contrary that there exist degrees d1 and d2,
with d1 < d2 such that y
∗
d1,U
< md1 and y
∗
d2,U
> 0. We
now construct a social state y¯ with a smaller social cost. Let
0 < ǫ < min(y∗d2,U,md1 − y
∗
d1,U
). We define
y¯d,U =


y∗d1,U + ǫ if d = d1
y∗d2,U − ǫ if d = d2,
y∗d,U otherwise.
(23)
In other words, in y¯, a smaller fraction of nodes with degree
d1 are vaccinated, and a larger fraction of nodes with degree
d2 are vaccinated compared to y
∗.
Before comparing the social costs at y∗ and y¯, we first
claim that v(y¯) < v(y∗). Suppose not, and we instead have
v(y¯) ≥ v(y∗). From (5), we have
〈d〉 =
∑
d∈D
d2y∗d,U
δ + dv(y∗)
=
∑
d∈D
d2y¯d,U
δ + dv(y¯)
≤
∑
d∈D
d2y¯d,U
δ + dv(y∗)
=⇒
∑
d∈D
d2(y∗d,U − y¯d,U)
δ + dv(y∗)
≤ 0
=⇒
−ǫd21
δ + d1v(y∗)
+
ǫd22
δ + d2v(y∗)
≤ 0, from (23)
=⇒ d22(δ + d1v(y
∗)) ≤ d21(δ + d2v(y
∗))
=⇒ δ(d22 − d
2
1) + d1d2v(y
∗)(d2 − d1) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction, since d2 > d1 and the left hand side
is strictly positive. Thus, we have v(y¯) < v(y∗).
We now compute the difference Ψ(y¯)−Ψ(y∗) as∑
d∈D
y¯d,U
[
dv(y¯)
δ + dv(y¯)
− c
]
−
∑
d∈D
y∗d,U
[
dv(y∗)
δ + dv(y∗)
− c
]
<
∑
d∈D
(y¯d,U − y
∗
d,U)
dv(y∗)
δ + dv(y∗)
= ǫ
[
d1v(y
∗)
δ + d1v(y∗)
−
d2v(y
∗)
δ + d2v(y∗)
]
< 0,
where the first inequality is a consequence of v(y¯) < v(y∗)
and
∑
d∈D y¯d,U =
∑
d∈D y
∗
d,U (following (23)). The second
inequality holds since d2 > d1. This contradicts the claim that
y∗ is the socially optimal social state.
The above result shows that a central authority would also
choose to vaccinate high degree nodes, and keep nodes with a
smaller degree unprotected. Furthermore, the population states
of unprotected nodes at a social optimum have a similar
structure as (10). Despite this structural similarity with the
PNE vis-a-vis Proposition 2, we show that a larger fraction
of nodes are vaccinated at a social optimum compared to the
PNE under true expectation minimizers, and when c ≥ w(c).
Following Proposition 2 and Proposition 7, we can express
the populations of unprotected nodes at the PNE and a social
optimum as
x∗
U
:= {m1,m2, . . . , xdx , 0, . . . , 0},
y∗
U
:= {m1,m2, . . . , ydy , 0, . . . , 0},
respectively, where xdx ∈ (0,mdx ] and ydy ∈ (0,mdy ]. We
have the following relationship between x∗
U
and y∗
U
.
Proposition 8: Let the players be either true expectation
minimizers or the vaccination cost and the nonlinear proba-
bility weighting function satisfy c ≥ w(c). Let social states at
the PNE and a social optimum be x∗ and y∗. Then, y∗  x∗,
or equivalently, either dy < dx or dy = dx and ydy ≤ xdx .
Proof: We prove the result for equilibria under true
expectation minimizers. The result for nonlinear probability
weighting then follows from Proposition 4.
We drop the superscript in the proof for better readability.
Assume on the contrary that x ≺ y. Following Lemma 1, we
have v(y) > v(x); recall that v(x) is the probability that a
randomly chosen neighbor is infected. Let ∆y := yU−xU > 0
(the inequality being component-wise) denote the population
of nodes who are unprotected at the social optimum y, but
vaccinated at the PNE. We compute the difference of social
costs at the PNE and the social optimum, Ψ(x)−Ψ(y), as∑
d∈D
xd,U
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
− c
]
−
∑
d∈D
yd,U
[
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
− c
]
=
∑
d∈D
xd,U
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
−
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
]
−
∑
d∈D
∆yd,U
[
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
− c
]
<−
∑
d∈D
∆yd,U
[
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
− c
]
. (24)
It remains to show that the right hand side in (24) is negative,
which will contradict the optimality of y. We consider the
following three exhaustive cases.
Case 1: dy = dx, ydy > xdx . In this case, we necessarily have
xdx < mdx . Then, from the definition of the PNE (7) and (8),
we have
c =
dxv(x)
δ + dxv(x)
<
dxv(y)
δ + dxv(y)
.
Furthermore,∆y = {0, . . . , 0, ydy−xdx , 0, . . . , 0} in this case.
Therefore, the expression in (24) is negative.
Case 2: dy > dx, xdx = mdx . Here no node with degree
strictly larger than dx remains unprotected at the PNE, i.e.,
c ≤
d′v(x)
δ + d′v(x)
<
d′v(y)
δ + d′v(y)
,
for every d′ > dx. Furthermore, in this case, ∆y =
{0, . . . , 0,mdx+1, . . . , ydy , 0, . . . , 0}. Therefore, the expres-
sion in (24) is negative in this case as well.
Case 3: dy > dx, xdx < mdx . Following similar reasoning
as the first two cases, we can conclude that c <
d′v(y)
δ+d′v(y) for
every d′ ≥ dx. Accordingly, the expression in (24) is negative.
Thus, we have the desired contradiction.
Thus, the above result shows that fewer nodes purchase
vaccination under decentralized decision making, i.e., nodes
exhibit free riding behavior. Related literature such as [19,
22, 38] have also shown that PNEs are inefficient in their
respective network security game settings. Our result in Propo-
sition 8 is analogous to those results. In addition, Proposition
8 holds even under behavioral probability weighting when the
vaccination cost is sufficiently high. While it is challenging to
compare the social costs under decentralized and centralized
decision making in general networks and probability weighting
functions, we prove an upper bound on the difference of social
costs for true expectation minimizers.
Proposition 9: Let the players be true expectation minimiz-
ers. Let social states at the PNE and a social optimum be x∗
and y∗, respectively. Then, Ψ(x∗)− Ψ(y∗) ≤ 〈d〉
δ
.
Proof:We drop the superscript ∗ from the social states for
better readability. From Proposition 8, we know that y  x.
Then, we have v(y) ≤ v(x) following Lemma 1. Let ∆x :=
xU−yU ≥ 0 (the inequality being component wise) denote the
population of nodes who are vaccinated at the social optimum,
but not at the PNE. We now compute
Ψ(x)−Ψ(y) =
∑
d∈D
(yd,U +∆xd,U)
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
− c
]
−
∑
d∈D
yd,U
[
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
− c
]
=
∑
d∈D
yd,Udv(x)
δ + dv(x)
−
yd,Udv(y)
δ + dv(y)
+ ∆xd,U
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
− c
]
≤
∑
d∈D
yd,U
[
dv(x)
δ + dv(x)
−
dv(y)
δ + dv(y)
]
(25)
≤
∑
d∈D
δyd,Ud(v(x) − v(y))
(δ + dv(y))2
≤
∑
d∈D
mdd
δ
=
〈d〉
δ
, (26)
where (25) follows from the definition of the PNE (7),3 and the
inequalities in (26) hold since v(y) ≤ v(x), v(x) ≤ 1, v(y) ≥
0, and yd,U ≤ md, ∀d ∈ D.
While the above bound is not necessarily tight, it provides
an important insight: the difference of social costs under
decentralized and centralized decision making does not grow
faster than the mean degree of the network.
VII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
We now illustrate some of our theoretical findings via
numerical examples. We consider networks with a power-law
degree distribution with exponent 3 and D = {1, 2, . . . , 100}.
We choose the curing rate δ = 2. We compute the PNE
and social optimum social states by leveraging threshold
properties and the characteristics of candidate social states.
All computations were carried out in MATLAB.
We first compare the PNE thresholds for different values
of the Prelec weighting parameter α (equation (1)). Recall
3Note that ∆xd,U > 0 only if a nonzero fraction of degree d nodes remain
unprotected. For such nodes, the infection probability at the endemic state
must be at most the vaccination cost c.
that α = 1 corresponds to true expectation minimizers and
smaller values of α implies a higher degree of over and
underweighting of low and high probabilities, respectively.
Figure 2a shows that for vaccination costs up to 0.5, the PNE
thresholds under true and behavioral perceptions of probabil-
ities are almost identical. As c increases to 1, the threshold
is much higher under nonlinear probability weighting than
under true expectation minimizers, confirming our findings in
Propositions 4 and 6.
Although the PNE thresholds are essentially identical for
vaccination costs up to 0.5, the population of unprotected
nodes are quite different for different values of α. As shown
in Proposition 4, for c < 1
e
, a larger fraction of nodes are
vaccinated under behavioral probability weighting than true
expectation minimizers, and vice versa. This can be observed
in Figure 2b which shows that the expected fraction of infected
nodes at the PNE (i.e., the quantity
∑
d∈D xd,U
dv(x)
δ+dv(x) ) is
smaller for smaller values of α when c < 1
e
, and vice versa.
Furthermore, as c→ 1, the expected fraction of infected nodes
saturates for the PNEs. This is because the total fraction of
nodes with degrees larger than 10 is negligible (0.003), and
increase in vaccination threshold beyond this level has limited
impact on the spread of the epidemic.
On the other hand, the expected fraction of infected nodes
at the social optimum is negligible and exhibits only slight
increase as the vaccination cost increases. We observed that at
the social optimum, the vaccination threshold is 1 (with a non-
negligible fraction of nodes with degree 1 being vaccinated)
for the entire range of c, in contrast with the PNE. Finally,
Figure 2c compares the respective social costs. Note that
the social cost at the social optimum is dominated by the
vaccination cost, while at the equilibrium, Ψ is dominated by
the expected fraction of nodes that are infected.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We investigated decentralized vaccination decisions by hu-
man decision-makers against networked SIS epidemics in a
population game framework. We first established the existence
and uniqueness of a threshold equilibrium, where only nodes
with degrees larger than a threshold vaccinate, and nodes
with degrees smaller than the threshold remain unprotected.
We then showed that if the vaccination cost is larger than a
quantity that depends on the probability weighting function,
then behavioral biases cause fewer nodes to vaccinate, and
vice versa. Furthermore, this result holds irrespective of the
network topology. We then obtained tight bounds on the ratio
of vaccination thresholds under nonlinear and true perceptions
of probabilities for a class of networks whose degree distri-
bution follows a power-law. Finally, we analyzed the socially
optimal vaccination policy. When nodes perceive probabilities
as their true values, we showed that fewer nodes vaccinate at
a PNE compared to a socially optimal vaccination policy, and
the difference in social costs is upper bounded by a quantity
proportional to the mean degree of the network. Our numerical
illustrations provided additional insights into the vaccination
decisions and security levels of networks under decentralized
and human decision-making.
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Fig. 2: PNE thresholds, expected fractions of infected nodes, and social costs for true and behavioral perceptions of infection
probabilities (with Prelec weighting functions) in networks with a power-law degree distribution with exponent 3.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
According to the NIMFA approximation of the SIS epi-
demic [12], the infection probability of node i, zi(t) ∈
[0, 1], t ≥ 0, evolves as
dzi(t)
dt
= −δzi(t) + (1− zi(t))
∑
j∈Ni
ajizj(t), (27)
where Ni is the set of in-neighbors of node i and aji ∈ R
denotes the weight or strength of connection between nodes j
and i. The above dynamics can be written in vector form as
dz(t)
dt
= −∆z(t) + (I − diag(z(t))Az(t), (28)
where I is the identity matrix, ∆ = diag(δ, δ, . . . , δ) is the
diagonal matrix of all curing rates, and A is the weighted
adjacency matrix of the network. In [43, 13], it was shown that
the statement of Theorem 1 holds for the NIMFA dynamics
(27) for R being the spectral radius of the matrix ∆−1AT .
We now prove Theorem 1 using the result from [43, 13] by
establishing a connection between the NIMFA and DBMF
approximations ((27) and (3), respectively).
Proof of Theorem 1: If all nodes vaccinate, then R(x) = 0 ≤
1, and clearly the only endemic state is pd(x) = 0, ∀d ∈ D.
Now, consider a social state x such that at least some fraction
of nodes remain unprotected. We now construct a directed
graph Gˆ(x) from the original network G such that the NIMFA
of the SIS epidemic on Gˆ(x) coincides with the DBMF
approximation (stated in (3)) on G. Specifically, let Gˆ(x) be a
weighted directed graph with the set of nodes D; each node
in Gˆ(x) represents a degree present in G.
We define the weight of an edge (j, i) ∈ D2 as aij(x) :=
iqˆj(x), where qˆj(x) =
jxj,U
〈d〉 . In particular, the strength of the
directed edge (j, i) is the product of i and the probability that a
node with degree i encounters an unprotected node with degree
j among her neighbors in the original graph G. Accordingly,
the adjacency matrix of Gˆ(x) is given by Aˆ(x) = d · q(x)T ,
where d is the vector of degrees of G, and q(x) = [ jxj,U〈d〉 ]j∈D .
In other words, Aˆ(x) has rank one with the only nonzero
eigenvalue given by λˆ(x) = q(x)Td =
∑
i∈D iqˆi(x).
Note that the evolution of the SIS epidemic in Gˆ(x) under
the NIMFA (27) coincides with (3). Furthermore, the spectral
radius of the matrix ∆−1AˆT (x) is R(x) =
∑
i∈D
iqˆi(x)
δ
.
Therefore, the uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium
points of the dynamics in (3) follow directly from [43, 13].
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2: Recall that β ∈ [2, 3]. Therefore,
1
iβ−2(δ+ivβ(xt))
in (19) is monotonically decreasing in i, and
t∑
i=d0
1
iβ−2(δ + ivβ(xt))
≥
t∑
i=d0
1
i(δ + ivβ(xt))
≥
∫ t
d0
di
i(δ + ivβ(xt))
,
(29)
where i corresponds to the degree and d refers to the integra-
tion variable. We denote the R.H.S. by
I(t) :=
∫ t
d0
di
i(δ + ivβ(xt))
=
1
δ
∫ t
d0
(δ + ivβ(xt)− ivβ(xt))di
i(δ + ivβ(xt))
=
1
δ
[∫ t
d0
di
i
−
∫ t
d0
vβ(xt)di
δ + ivβ(xt)
]
=
1
δ
[
log
(
t
d0
)
− log
(
δ + tvβ(xt)
δ + d0vβ(xt)
)]
=
1
δ
log
(
t(δ + d0vβ(xt))
d0(δ + tvβ(xt))
)
.
Recall from (19) that the first term in (29) is
〈d〉
κ
. Therefore,
from I(t) ≤ 〈d〉
κ
, we obtain
log
(
t(δ + d0vβ(xt))
d0(δ + tvβ(xt))
)
≤
δ〈d〉
κ
=⇒
t(δ + d0vβ(xt))
d0(δ + tvβ(xt))
− 1 ≤ e
δ〈d〉
κ − 1 = B1 − 1
=⇒
(B1 − 1)−1(t− d0)δ
d0
≤ δ + tvβ(xt) (30)
=⇒
δ
δ + tvβ(xt)
≤
d0(B1 − 1)
t− d0
(31)
=⇒
tvβ(xt)
δ + tvβ(xt)
≥ 1−
d0(B1 − 1)
t− d0
=
t− d0B1
t− d0
. (32)
For the second part, let d0 > 1 and β = 3. Then,
〈d〉
κ
=
t∑
i=d0
1
iβ−2(δ + ivβ(xt))
≤
∫ t
d0−1
di
i(δ + ivβ(xt))
.
Thus, we repeat the above analysis reversing the inequalities
and replacing d0 with d0 − 1, and obtain
tv3(xt)
δ + tv3(xt)
≤
t− (d0 − 1)B1
t− (d0 − 1)
. (33)
This concludes the proof.
